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This study empirically examines a sample of national wireless spectrum assignments 
for  the  period  2000-2007  to  identify  the  sources  of  revenue  variations.  An 
econometric model that recognises the censored nature of the sample relates per 
capita  winning  bid  (per  Mhz)  values  to  auction  design  variables  (license  award 
process), national and mobile market conditions, spectrum package attributes and 
post-award  obligations  identified  from  national  regulatory  authority  tender 
documents. The analysis reveals that most auction design variables independently 
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During the five decades since the seminal work of Friedman (1956) and Vickrey (1961), 
auction theory has developed into an established field of economic research. However, the 
application of this accumulated knowledge to allocate operating rights in telecommunication 
markets  only  occurred  in  1990  with  the  New  Zealand  government’s  decision  to  license 
spectrum by auction. The argument for using the ‘price system’ (via an auction) to allocate 
spectrum licences is premised on economic efficiency arguments that: (a) it eliminates the 
rent dissipation associated with ‘beauty contest’ awards; (b) assignment of licences is made 
to most productive suppliers; and (c)  generated  public revenues displace taxes (Cramton, 
2001).  Currently,  auctions  are  equally  the  most  commonly  used  mechanism  (along  with 
administrative  processes  or  beauty  contests)  to  assign  wireless  spectrum  in  national 
telecommunications markets. During the period 2000-2007, 83 national 3G spectrum licenses 
are  assigned  via  auctions  organized  by  national  regulatory  authorities  (NRAs)  in  twenty 
countries. 
 
Although  the  use  of  auctions  to  (re)organize  telecommunication  markets  is  only  recent, 
national spectrum auction outcomes vary markedly in terms of revenue raised by country and 
time period.
1 For instance, revenue (per capita) obtained from the auction of 3G licenses in 
the year 2000 are as high as €650 in the United Kingdom (UK), but with values of €100 
(Austria), €615 (Germany), €240 (Italy), €170 (the Netherlands), and €20 (Switzerland) also 
realized. Clearly, such huge revenue differences are not explained solely by national mobile 
market and economic conditions. Paul Klemperer, an advisor (together with Ken Binmore) to 
UK government’s Radiocommunications Agency on the design and conduct of one of the 
most successful spectrum auctions, remarks in Klemperer (2002a, b) that it is mainly the 
NRAs’ inappropriate choice of auction design that led to the failure in some of the early 
European spectrum auctions. Also, an appraisal of these auctions is made by Peter Cramton 
(2001), who advised governments for several telecommunications auctions in the Australia, 
Canada and the United States.
2 While these surveys provided helpful insight as to what went 
wrong and what  really  matters in the European spectrum  auctions, these analyses lacked 
rigorous  empirical  examination  to  identify  statistically  the  impact  of  auction  design  and 
                                                           
1 Based on these arguments, a literature on the implementation of auctions emerged, with auction ‘successes’ 
typically measured by the magnitude of license receipts. Recently, Hazlett and Muñoz (2009) demonstrate that 
the focus on revenue as a measure of success might be flawed. 
2 The United States Federal Communications Commission followed this example three years later. 3 
 
license  conditions  (as  specified  in  NRA  tender  documents)  on  realized  revenues.  The 
apparent need for such applied work is only recently acknowledged with the emergence of 
digital  dividends  from  the  release  of  spectrum  from  analogue  TV  switch  off  and  the 
reallocation of spectrum bands to meet emerging fourth-generation wireless market needs. 
Accordingly, this study constructs an econometric model to examine the impact of national 
and  mobile  market  conditions,  spectrum  package  attributes,  post-award  obligations  and  a 
license  award  condition  (viz.,  initial  deposits  requirements)  on  the  winning  bid  prices 
observed in the 2000-2007 period for national 3G spectrum license auctions. 
 
Importantly, the study’s focus allows exploration of the impact of auction designs, rules and 
award processes on the realized revenues. The particular auction attributes analyzed (license 
award processes) are: number of bidders per license; availability of an activity rule; publicity 
of bid information; flexibility of the number of licenses; availability of package bidding; and 
the bid format (sealed or open). Study findings show that most of these license award/auction 
design variables independently impact on 3G spectrum auction revenues. 
 
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, a comprehensive empirical account of what 
matters  for  past  spectrum  auction  ‘success’  (in  terms  of  realized  revenue)  is  provided. 
Second,  the  empirical  findings  concerning  auction  design  processes  and  realized  revenue 
provides a natural test of several game-theoretic predictions of the auction theory.
3 Received 
empirical analysis of auction data generally tests game-theoretic predictions conditioned on 
the informational context. A strand of applied literature (Mead 1967; Smith 1977; Gaver and 
Zimmerman 1977; Heckman 1977; Brannman et al. 1987) tests the empirical validity of the 
winner’s  curse  -  a  phenomenon  observed  in  the  ‘symmetric  common  value’  model.  Yet 
another strand (Mead 1967; Johnson 1979; Mead et al. 1981; Hansen 1985) tests the ‘revenue 
equivalence theorem’ - a prediction from the ‘independent private value’ model.
4 Clearly, an 
alternative approach to testing is to question the empirical validity of particular informational 
                                                           
3 Thus, uncertainty about bidder valuations can take several forms: (a) every bidder may privately know the 
value of an object independently from the valuations of the other bidders (the independent private values case); 
and (b) bidder valuations can be interdependent., e.g., symmetric (in which the bidders have private signals 
about a common valuation) or asymmetric (in which only some bidders are completely informed about the 
common value of the object) common value. Auction theory is generally interested in the design of optimal 
mechanisms (consisting of a game-form involving a set of available bidder strategies, rules of the game and 
allocation rules) to sell an object to bidders whose valuations are unknown sellers and other bidders. In all 
informational situations, auction outcomes are determined via a non-cooperative game played by bidders under 
rules determined by their beliefs about the goods valuation and/or signals from other bidders. 
4 Laffont (1997) surveys a wide range of applied work with the auction data. 4 
 
models conditional on the game theoretic restrictions or predictions of the auction theory. 
Both approaches are employed in interpreting empirical findings contained in this paper. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces factors that affect 
mobile network operator (MNO) spectrum valuations. Section 3 presents national spectrum 
national auction data and variables, and Section 4 presents the model. Section 5 contains 
model estimates and their interpretation. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Factors affecting MNO Spectrum Valuations 
An  MNO  (Operator  ) j   assesses  an  opportunity  to  acquire  spectrum  based  on  whether 
ij ij r b 0 − > , where  ij r  is the projected net revenue from use of  spectrum package i  (based on 
spectrum award conditions, and operating revenue and cost estimates) through the license 
period, and  ij b  is the final spectrum bid price made by the operator for the spectrum resource. 
Further,  the  quantity 
min
ij ij b b 0 − >   is  the  bid  premium  an  operator  offers  to  obtain  the 
spectrum license, i.e., the excess above the reserve bid price (
min
i b ) required by the NRA in 
the tender document. The award value must not only exceed the minimum required spectrum 
bid price but be the largest value among all bidders. The spectrum assignment is efficient 
when the bid price accurately reflects the underlying opportunity costs of the firm.
5 When 
min
ij ij r b 0 − <  then no bid is made as the operator incurs losses in providing 3G service over the 
spectrum. From the published spectrum awards, data observable to the analyst is the winner’s 
bid price, 
*
ij b . When there is no bid (and hence no winner) 
*
ij b    is censored at a zero value. 
 
Factors that potentially impact on the winning spectrum bid price that are identified by the 
literature  include  spectrum  package  attributes.  Attributes  considered  in  the  analysis  are: 
license  duration  (Klemperer,  2002a),  whether  an  entrant  must  be  awarded  a  license 
(Klemperer, 2002a), and the magnitude of the required minimum bid (reserve) price (Burguet 
and Sakovics, 1996; Klemperer, 2002a). Variables that describe the license award process 
include the competitiveness of the process (Klemperer, 2002b) and auction design variables, 
viz., whether: (a) there are activity rules; (b) information is made available at the end of each 
                                                           
5 Standard auctions (at best) ensure that the bidder with the highest private value wins, rather than the highest 
social value. Private and social values diverge as the winners compete in a marketplace (Cramton, 2002: 608). 5 
 
round; (c) there is a single sealed-bid; (d) license number is determined endogenously; and (e) 
if package bidding is allowed. 
 
Additionally, operator post-award financial and network performance obligations potentially 
impact on the spectrum bid price. A financial performance obligation variable considered is 
annual  license  fees  based  on  a  proportion  of  3G  revenues  (Bauer,  2003),  while  network 
performance  obligation  variables  included  are  infrastructure  sharing,  and  a  variable  that 
accounts  for  population  coverage  and  timing  (Klemperer,  2002b).  Finally,  exogenous 
variables  that  reflect  national  economic  and  mobile  market  conditions,  respectively,  are 
national  income  (Börgers  and  Dustmann,  2003),  market  size  and  the  competitiveness  of 
domestic mobile telephony markets (Klemperer, 2002a).
6 
 
3. Data and Variables 
The  first  3G  spectrum  license  auctions  are  held  in  Western  Europe  in  2000.
7  This  study 
examines a sample of 81 licenses from 21 national auctions for 2000–2007. These data are 
sourced  from  the  DotEcon  (2008)  Spectrum  Awards  Database.  Table  1  and  Table  2, 
respectively,  present  the  definition,  mean  and  standard  deviation  for  the  dependent  and 
independent variables used in the empirical analysis. The dependent variable in this study is 
the winning bid for spectrum (measured per MHz, per million populations). The variable is 
typically  considered  by  economists  to  reflect  the  value  of  the  spectrum  package  to  the 
winning operator. In particular, higher revenues arise from product market extension to 3G 
spectrum,  thus  adding  revenue  streams  otherwise  not  feasible  from  current  activities. 
Synergistic benefits also arise from lower costs (e.g., savings may occur through improved 
productivity or network economies).





                                                           
6 Spectrum lot size and licence availability are implicitly controlled for in the regression equation. In particular, 
the dependent variable (WBID) is adjusted for the amount of spectrum in each licence. Namely, the winning bid 
is US$m per MHz per million population. The number of licences up for auction enters via the competition 
variable ACOMP. Namely, ACOMP = Licences/Bidders. Additionally, an anonymous referee has pointed out 
that the availability of substitutable spectrum now and in the future is likely to affect spectrum valuations. 
7 Finland is the first country to assign 3G spectrum via a beauty contest in 1999. 
8 The spectral efficiency is the number of bits that can be sent per second over a channel of a given bandwidth 
(Gruber, 2001: 62). 6 
 
Table 1. Dependent Variable Summary Statistics, 2000–2007 
Variable  Definition  Mean  Std Dev. 
       
WBID  = Spectrum payment /MHz /million population (US$m)  0.88  1.33 
       
 
Table 1 indicates there is substantial variation in WBID values across national assignments. 
Given the impact WBID values have on auction revenue and network deployment, identifying 
the source of this variation is important. Independent variables (listed in Table 2) which are 
proposed to explain WBID are divided into the categories: national economic and mobile 
market; spectrum package attributes; post-award financial obligations; post-award network 




Table 2. Independent Variable Summary Statistics, 2000–2007 
Variable  Definition  Mean  Std Dev. 
       
National economic and mobile market     
       
INCOME  = Real GDP per capita (US$ PPP)  21,607  9,564 
       
MARKET  = Size of population covered by license (millions)  346.18  504.19 
       
MCOMP  = Inverse of one plus the number of facilities-based operators  0.22  0.04 
       
SHIFT  = 1, if auction is held in 2001–2007; = 0, otherwise  0.62  0.49 
       
Spectrum package attributes     
       
DURATION  = License term (years)  17.95  2.86 
       
ENTRANT   = 1, if at least one license must be awarded to entrant; = 0, otherwise  0.12  0.33 
       
RESERVE  = Minimum allowable spectrum bid price (US$ millions)  184.81  444.16 
       
Post-award financial obligations     
       
PERCENT  = Mean annual license fee (% of 3G revenue)  0.22  0.68 
       
Post-award network deployment obligations     
       
DEPLOY  = % of population to be covered by license/years to achieve cover  0.12  0.08 
       
SHARE  = 1, if infrastructure sharing is imposed; = 0, otherwise  0.33  0.47 
       
License award process     
       
ACOMP  = Bidders to available licenses (ratio)  1.21  0.59 
       
ACTIVITY  = 1, if there is an activity rule; = 0, otherwise  0.62  0.49 
       
INFO  = 1, if bid information made public every round; = 0, otherwise  0.38  0.49 
       
NUMBER  = 1, if license number is exogenous; = 0, otherwise  0.74  0.44 
       
PACKAGE  = 1, if package bidding is allowed; = 0, otherwise  0.27  0.45 
       
SEALED  = 1, if the auction is sealed-bid; = 0, otherwise  0.20  0.40 
       
 
Table 3 lists total auctions, number of assigned licenses and average WBID values by year. 







Table 3. Selected Auction Summary Data by Year, 2000–2007 
Year  Auctions  Licenses Assigned  Mean Annual WBID 
       
2000  6  31  1.95 
       
2001  7  29  0.25 
       
2002  1  5  0.37 
       
2003  0  0  – 
       
2004  0  0  – 
       
2005  3  5  0.26 
       
2006  2  6  0.05 
       
2007  2  5  0.05 
       
       
Sample  21  81  0.88 
       
 
 
Table 3 shows that spectrum winning bids attenuate through time. Indeed, all WBID values 
greater  than  the  sample  mean  (0.88)  occur  in  2000,  probably  due  to  overly  optimistic 
expectations about the profitability of 3G service markets. The mean WBID value for 2001–
2007 is only 0.22. Accordingly, the independent variable SHIFT (Table 2) allows for a shift 
in spectrum valuations in 2001. The impact of license award process variables on WBID 
values are of particular interest. Table 4 lists the conditional probabilities that a specified 
license award process variable is mandated, given that the associated winning bid value is 
above  the  sample  mean.  These  data  are  for  national  market  auctions  held  in  2001–2007 
period. Thus, Table 4 identifies variables associated with ‘high’ WBID values during a period 
of stable spectrum valuations. 
 
Table 4. Conditional Probabilities, 2001–2007 
  (   ) P WBID WBID ⋅ >  
   
ACTIVITY = 1  0.62 
   
INFO = 1  0.46 
   
NUMBER = 1  0.00 
   
PACKAGE = 1  0.08 
   
SEALED = 1  0.31 
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Table 4 indicates that auctions held during the 2001–2007 period with above average WBID 
values are 62% likely to have activity rules, 46% likely to have information available after 
each round and 31% likely to be sealed-bid. Interestingly, licenses with an endogenously 
determined  number  of  licenses  and  package  bidding  have  respectively,  0%  and  0.8% 
probability of having above average WBID values. NRA-controlled license award process 
variables are further analysed to determine if common bundles of auction rules exist across 
countries. In particular, bivariate correlations are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5. Selected License Award Process Variable Correlations, 2000–2007 
  INFO  NUMBER  PACKAGE  SEALED 
         
ACTIVITY  –0.01      0.23    0.25    –0.63   
                 
INFO    –0.47    –0.08    –0.14   
                 
NUMBER          0.40    –0.29   
                   
PACKAGE                –0.09   
         
 
Of the ten reported correlations, nine are less than 0.5 in absolute value, with none greater 
than  0.63.  This  finding  suggests  that  across  countries  distinct  bundles  of  license  award 
processes  are  employed.  Such  bundles  may  reflect  particular  NRA  goals  (e.g.,  revenue 
maximisation, market entry or network deployment). This variation enables the identification 
of variables that influence realized WBID. 
 
4. Regression Model 
The dependent variable WBID is censored with only winning bid values greater than the 
reserve bid price observed. That is, the observed price must not only be the largest value 
among all bidders, but must also exceed the NRA-specified minimum spectrum bid price. 
When  the  maximum  bid  (based  on  operator  valuation)  does  not  exceed  the  minimum 
spectrum bid price then the associated ‘observed’ price is zero. The regression model based 
on the preceding discussion is referred to as the censored regression model. The regression is 
obtained by making the mean of the censored  model correspond to a  classical regression 
model. The general formulation is usually given in terms of an index function: 
 
  * ' , β ε = + ij ij ij y x  
* 0  if   0, ij ij y y = ≤  
(1) 10 
 
* *   if   0, ij ij ij y y y = >  
 
where  1 (1, ,..., )' = i i ip x x x   is  a  vector  of  p  covariates  which  affect  Spectrum Package i 
valuations and  0 1 ( , ,..., )' β β β β = j j j jp  is a corresponding vector of parameters to be estimated. 
The  stochastic  component  , εij   consists  of  unobserved  factors  that  explain  the  marginal 
spectrum valuations of  Operator j . Each  εij  is drawn from a  J -variate Normal distribution 
with  zero  conditional  mean  and  variance,  where  ~ (0, ). ε Σ N   For  a  randomly-drawn 




ij ij ij  ij
x





= Φ +    
 
  (2) 
where: 
  ' '
ij ij
 ij ' '
ij ij
[(0 x )/ ] [x )/ ]
.
1 [(0 x )/ ] [(x )/ ]
φ β σ φ β σ
λ




  (3) 
 
For the case with censoring at zero and normally distributed disturbances, the marginal effects 
in the censored regression model, are: 
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The log-likelihood function for the censored regression model is: 
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  (5) 
 
Finally,  the  estimated  coefficients  are  comprised  of  both  the  impact  of  changes  in  the 
observed  WBID  and  the  probability  any  bid  is  a  winning  WBID  value  (McDonald  and 
Moffitt, 1980). For coefficient values above the limit the marginal effects is scaled for the 11 
 
probability that the latent variable is observed.
9 Limdep calculates the conditional mean of the 
model at the mean of the independent variables to scale the coefficients. 
 
5. Estimation 
Estimation  is  via  Limdep  version  9.0.  Table  6  reports  joint  significance  tests  for  the 
explanatory variable categories: national economic and mobile market conditions; spectrum 
package attributes; network obligations; and license award process. The tests reject the null 
hypotheses that all the variable groupings are insignificant except for network obligations. 
 
Table 6. Joint Significance Tests 
Category  Variable  Wald statistic 
 











Network obligations  DEPLOY 
SHARE 
1.16 
     








Notes: *** significant at 1%. The above categories are tested as they contain several variables. 
 
The censored regression model estimates reported in Table 7 indicate a significant Lagrange 
Multiplier test of model restrictions. Also, ANOVA (22%) and DECOMP (35%) fit measures 
show improvement in the log-likelihood relative to the restricted model. 
 
                                                           
9 Limdep provides a scale factor, analogous to the sample proportion of observations above the limit, to compute 
the marginal effects of the independent variables (Greene, 2008). 12 
 
 
Table 7. Censored Regression Estimates 
Category  Variable  Coefficient  Marginal Effect 
       
  Constant  –3.602*** 
(0.917)   
       
       
National economic and mobile 
market conditions 
















       
       












       
       




       
       








       
       
























       
       
  N  81   
  ANOVA  0.81   
  DECOMP  0.93   
  Log likelihood  –38.15   
       
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Turning to the impact of the explanatory variables on the 3G winning bid value (WBID), 
several distinct patterns emerge from examining Table 7. Firstly, most national economic and 
mobile  market  condition  variables  are  individually  significant  in  explaining  winning  bid 
behavior. In particular, higher winning bids occur for licenses with a larger national market 
(MARKET = 0.000) and higher per-capita income (INCOME = 0.000). These results are 
consistent  with  the  predictions  of  pricing  theory  as  well  as  the  outcomes  of  early  3G 
auctions.
10 Moreover, WBID values are lower post-2000 (SHIFT = –2.408). The observation 
that the time sequence of national 3G auctions matters is established by Klemperer (2003). 
Klemperer argues that during the year 2000 auctions while more entrants participated; some 
bidders are ‘weak’. Klemperer argues that the non-collusive behaviour of naive strong bidders 
in early auctions is the reason for the observed sequence of declining bids. According to 
Klemperer (2002b),  “the UK sale taught  firms the  costs of participating in a competitive 
auction, and they became increasingly successful at forming joint ventures that ensured the 
subsequent  auctions  were  less  competitive.”  Another  argument  by  Klemperer  is  that 
intertemporal complementarity between early and later auctions in that early wins strengthens 
the  position  of  incumbents  opposing  potential  entrants  in  later  auctions.  Clearly,  this 
dynamically induced asymmetry between bidders in later auctions reduces competition and 
winning  bid  premiums.  Also  noteworthy  is  that  the  effect  of  MCOMP  on  WBID  is 
insignificant, i.e., the number of national facilities-based operators does not affect the winning 
bid.
11  This  outcome  contrasts  with  the  prediction  that  the  fewer  facilities-based  operators 
(higher MCOMP value) in a market, the more bidders for a license, hence higher WBID 
values. 
 
For variables describing spectrum package attributes, both length of license and reserve price 
matter  (DURATION  =  0.234  and  RESERVE  =  0.000).  Importantly,  license  duration  is 
specified by NRAs in tender documents. Thus, the positive sign for DURATION is consistent 
with the predicted positive association between the winning license bid and license value to 
the winning bidder. The reported positive sign of RESERVE is consistent with the view of 
Klemperer  (2002a)  and  Cramton  (2004)  that  sufficiently  high  reserve  prices  discourage 
collusion, as well as, with the claims of Cramton (2002) that high reserve prices lower the 
                                                           
10 Cramton (2001) argues that part of the difference in the winning bids observed in the early European 3G 
auctions (UK, Germany vs. Netherland, Switzerland) is explained by the per capita size of the markets. 
11  A  facilities-based  operator  has  a  licence  that  allows  the  deployment  of  any  form  of  telecommunication 
networks and facilities by any persons to provide telecommunication services to third parties. 14 
 
incentive for demand reduction in a multiple-item auction and reduce the number of rounds 
that bidders have to coordinate a split of licenses without increasing bids. 
 
Additionally,  the  spectrum  package  variable  ENTRANT  is  not  significant  (10%)  which 
contrasts with the claim that by awarding at least a single license to a non-incumbent firm the 
auctioneer expects to attract more (new) bidders and so receive higher winning bids. For 
instance,  in  the  UK  auction  (most  successful  3G  auction),  which  guaranteed  license 
availability to one new entrant, attracted nine such bidders and four established incumbent 
firms. Should the number of licenses equal incumbent numbers, it is not unlikely that some 
potential entrants will participate independently or partner with an incumbent bidder (the 
latter is the case, e.g., in the Netherland’s unsuccessful 3G auction). Inadequate competition 
between  bidders  is  more  severe  when  an  auction  is  ascending.  In  this  situation  potential 
entrants are strategically disadvantaged when bid information is revealed by round. While the 
auctioneer can attenuate the insufficient entry problem by choosing an Anglo-Dutch auction, 
such hybrid auctions are rarely used in 3G spectrum markets. 
 
Table 7 indicates that the mean annual license fee (PERCENT) imposed by NRAs as a post-
award  financial obligation is not important in the decision calculus applied by MNOs in 
bidding. Network obligations imposed on operators by NRAs are DEPLOY (percentage of 
population  to  be  covered  and  years  to  achieve  network  coverage)  and  SHARE  (required 
sharing  of  network  infrastructure),  which  are  also  potentially  important.
12  Increases  in 
DEPLOY plausibly augment expected operator profit, when DEPLOY is below the optimal 
operating  scale.  Given  that  DEPLOY  is  reported  insignificant,  it  may  be  the  case  that 
DEPLOY is binding for some of the potential bidders, or else for a substantial part of the 
licenses, population is widely dispersed in covered regions. As for SHARE, Binmore and 
Klemperer  (2002)  argue  that  the  SHARE  obligation  eliminates  (or  reduces)  the  cost 
advantage of incumbents (already operate 2G licenses) over potential new entrants, attracting 
bidders  and  making  higher  winning  bids  more  likely.  Conversely,  infrastructure  sharing 
reduces  the  value  of  an  auctioned  license  from  an  incumbent’s  perspective.  Indeed, 
conflicting views of incumbents and potential entrants on infrastructure sharing may explain 
the insignificant impact of SHARE on the winning bid. Finally, more spectrum competition 
                                                           
12 It should be noted that the effect of DEPLOY on WBID cannot be predicted independently of two related 
attributes, namely the planned optimal (minimum efficient) operating scale of the potential bidders and the 
dispersion of population in a given country, which are not contained in the dataset. 15 
 
(ACOMP = 0.730) increases WBID. The importance of the number of bidders per license for 
the  success  of  an  auction  is  emphasized  by  Klemperer  (2002a)  in  his  evaluation  of  the 
European 3G auctions. 
 
Interestingly, the incidence of NRA-specified auction design variables, e.g., activity rules 
(ACTIVITY = –0.415), information sharing (INFO = 0.525) and endogenously determined 
licenses  (NUMBER  –2.145)  impact  on  WBID.  The  common  part  of  the  activity  rules 
announced in 3G auctions require bidders to submit active bids for the auctioned license (or 
on some minimum number of frequency packages) to not be disqualified. Such rules aim to 
prevent delayed bidding (concealing information) by firms and increase expected revenue. 
However, the estimated negative sign of the regression coefficient of ACTIVITY suggests 
that other activity rules (e.g., German and Austrian auctions), such as limiting the number of 
frequency blocks/packages that firms can bid and bounding the maximal number of active 
bids  in  any  round  from  above  by  the  number  of  active  bids  in  the  previous  round,  may 
depress competition between non-collusive firms. 
 
The estimated positive impact of INFO on WBID is expected since publicly announced bid 
information,  including  the  identity  of  bidders  and  their  bids,  after  every  round  reduces 
bidders’ private information, hence informational rents. Table 7 also shows that (flexible) 
NUMBER (of licenses) adversely affects seller revenue. A common belief is that auctions are 
most profitable from the seller’s viewpoint when there are more licenses than incumbents.
13 
The main reason for this belief is cost asymmetry faced by the incumbents and potential new 
entrants in building 3G networks, with incumbents able to use 2G infrastructures to provide 
3G  services.  The  fear  of  losing  profit  from  existing  2G  services  to  potential  entrants 
aggravates this asymmetry.
14 To address strategic incumbent advantage, some NRA’s (e.g., 
Austria, Germany and Italy) employed auction designs that allow flexible license numbers 
and  capacity  allocations.  However,  most  of  these  designs  proved  unsuccessful.  For  a 
spectrum block involving 2x10 MHz + 5 MHz, the (per capita) revenue raised in the Italian 
case (US$ 35.2) is a third of the revenue (US$ 107.2) from the UK auction, while the revenue 
from the Austrian auction is lower at US$ 15.3.
15 Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) are critical of 
                                                           
13 This belief is not invalidated by the observation that in the most successful telecommunications auction (the 
UK) the exogenously set number of licenses exceeded the number of incumbents by ‘one’. 
14 For a discussion on the strategic advantage of incumbents against possible new entrants in the auctions for 3G 
spectrum licenses, see Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000). 
15 See Cramton (2001) for a comparison of the early European auctions to the UK auction. 16 
 
the  flexible  license  number  specifications  in  the  German  auction.  Jehiel  and  Moldovanu 
argue that while this design enticed entry by two new firms (and four incumbent bidders), the 
auction  favoured  incumbents  and  yielded  lower  revenue.  The  design  endogenized  bidder 
values unintentionally and gave incumbents an incentive to pre-empt entry by new bidders. 
 
Of the license award process variables, PACKAGE (bidding), which is used in 27% of the 
spectrum auctions in the sample, is insignificant in explaining winning bids. Auction theory 
suggests that with complementarity, it is more profitable for sellers to auction licenses in 
packages using a ‘combinatorial auction’.
16 That is, when there is bidder complementarity 
between licenses, the sequential (or simultaneous) auction of licenses separately leads to an 
‘exposure’ problem. Namely, bidding for complementary licences is risky since bidders may 
not win all desired components. Thus, the exposure problem suppresses competition. Package 
bidding  solves  the  exposure  problem  but  introduces  additional  problems.  First,  package 
(combinatorial) auctions are complex to analyse for bidders and sellers. Choosing an optimal 
bidding strategy and determining the winner are difficult computational problems. Second, 
Cramton (2004) argues that combinatorial auctions favour bidders seeking large packages. 
Therefore,  package  bidding  probably  leads  efficiency  and  revenue  loss.  Given  the 
insignificant  impact  of  PACKAGE  on  winning  bids,  it  is  reasonable  to  argue  that 
complementarity between licenses is not important or that package bidding problems may 
outweighed benefits. 
 
Finally,  the  effect  of  SEALED  on  WBID  is  unclear.  Auction  theory  suggests  that  more 
entrants and higher returns are expected under sealed-bid auctions than non-sealed (mostly 
ascending) simultaneous auctions (proposed by Paul Milgrom, Robert Wilson and Preston 
McAfee), since collusion is harder in sealed-bid auctions as bids cannot be used as signals 
(Klemperer 2002a). Additionally, when bidders have common license values the winner’s 
curse  is  less  severe  for  potential  weak  bidders  in  sealed-bid  auctions.  This  circumstance 
makes weak bidders more willing to enter sealed-bid auctions and bid more aggressively, 
leading to higher winning bids (Klemperer 1998; Bulow et al. 1999). Besides, when bidders 
are risk averse, open-bid (first price) auctions yield more revenue than ascending auctions. 
Furthermore,  the  sealed-bid  format  is  less  vulnerable  to  demand  manipulation  than  the 
                                                           
16 For a thorough discussion on package bidding, see Milgrom (2004). 17 
 
simultaneous ascending format (used in most spectrum auctions).
17 Conversely, where license 
value signals are affiliated (Milgrom and Weber 1982) sealed-bid auctions are less profitable 
than ascending auctions if bidders are symmetric, risk-neutral and not budget-constrained. 
Klemperer (2003) explains that sealed-bid auctions are inferior when signals about values are 
affiliated by observing that bidder profits derive from private information and that sealed-bid 
auctions (unlike ascending auctions) do not reduce private information. As SEALED does not 
explain WBID, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that diverse predictions of auction 
theory about the impact of SEALED may have occurred in this sample of 3G auctions. 
 
Table  8  contains  elasticity  estimates  for  policy  relevant  (under  NRA  control)  variables. 
Elasticity values (evaluated at the sample mean of the independent variables) that are either 
elastic (or near elastic) have a more important impact on operator auction bidding behaviour. 
The DURATION elasticity value suggests that when the license duration increases by 1% 
above the mean there is a 4.756% increase in WBID value (increase in the perceived value of 
the license to the winning bidder). Additionally, the ACOMP (auction competition) elasticity 
indicates that a 1% increase in auction competition leads to a 1.001% increase in WBID 
values. The absolute values of the estimated elasticities for RESERVE, ACTIVITY, INFO 
and NUMBER are less than unity in absolute magnitude. In particular, higher reservation 
prices (RESERVE) or the incidence of mandated information sharing (INFO) result in higher 
winning  bids.  Moreover,  the  incidence  of  mandated  activity  rules  (ACTIVITY)  or 
endogenous license number (NUMBER) decrease winning bids. 
                                                           
17 Cramton (2004) addresses the problem with simultaneous ascending auctions whereby when competition for 
the auction is weak, bidders (incumbents) have an incentive to reduce their demands to keep the price low. 18 
 
 
Table 8. NRA Control Variable Elasticity Estimates 
Category  Variable  Elasticity 
     
Spectrum package attributes  DURATION  4.756 
     
  ENTRANT  0.019 
     
  RESERVE  0.072 
     
Financial obligations  PERCENT  –0.019 
     
Network obligations  DEPLOY  0.099 
     
  SHARE  0.012 
     
License award process  ACOMP  1.001 
     
  ACTIVITY  –0.290 
     
  INFO  0.228 
     
  NUMBER  –0.451 
     
  PACKAGE  0.062 
     
  SEALED  –0.009 
   
 
Note: Bold indicates the coefficient is significant. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This  paper  attempts  to  identify  the  determinants  per  capita  revenue  from  national  3G 
spectrum auctions. Sample per capita winning bids are regressed on national economic and 
mobile  market  conditions,  spectrum  package  attributes,  network  obligations  and  license 
award process variables. Censored model estimation establishes that most of the economic 
and mobile market conditions are individually significant; licenses auctioned before the year 
2001, auctioned in countries with larger national markets or with higher per-capita income 
yield on average higher revenue. Of spectrum package attributes, license duration and reserve 
price are significant. But, neither the post-award financial obligation (mean annual license 
fee)  nor  post-award  network  obligations  (percentage  of  population  to  be  covered,  and 
whether infrastructure sharing is required) explain winning bid values. Interestingly, most of 
the license award process (ratio of bidders to auctioned licenses, availability of an activity 
rule, publicity of the bid information during the auction, and flexibility of the number of 19 
 
licenses) variables are significant. Only the availability of package bidding and the format 
(sealed or open) of bids are insignificant. 
 
A limitation of the analysis is the sample does not allow the testing of several interesting 
propositions that are potentially important. In particular, whether the availability of the resale 
option or use of hybrid (Anglo-Dutch) auctions affects realised auction revenues. Klemperer 
(2002a) argues that an ability to resell licenses attracts more entrants in sealed-bid auctions. 
Klemperer also claims that, in situations where the number of licenses does not exceed the 
incumbents’ number, more revenue is likely generated by auctions with a hybrid (Anglo-
Dutch) format than by the pure Anglo (ascending bid) or pure Dutch (sealed bid) formats.
18 
For the period 2000-2007, only Czech Republic and Nigerian NRAs apply this mixed design. 
Another interesting hypothesis, due to Klemperer (2002a), that requires additional data to 
consider auctions where the number of bidders relative to available licenses is ‘large’. In this 
situation auction design variables (license award processes) are immaterial. For the current 
sample the number of available licenses per bidder exhibits little variation (0.39) around the 
mean value of 0.99. Finally, further analysis is required to examine the impact of auction 
design, national economic and mobile market conditions, spectrum package attributes and 
network  obligations  on  ‘pre-award’  competition  for  the  auctioned  licenses.  Such  analysis 
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